"Parliament's power to amend the Constitution is a limited power and it cannot be enlarged into absolute power." In the light of this statement explain whether Parliament under Article 368 of the Constitution can destroy the Basic Structure of the Constitution by expanding its amending power?

Article 368 of the Indian Constitution grants Parliament the constituent power to amend the Constitution by way of addition, variation, or repeal. However, the Indian Parliament is not entirely sovereign; its powers are derived from and limited by the Constitution.

The statement in the question directly stems from the landmark Minerva Mills vs. Union of India (1980) judgment, which established that Parliament cannot use its amending power to destroy the fundamental identity of the Constitution.

Evolution of the Limited Amending Power The conflict between Parliamentary sovereignty and Constitutional supremacy underwent a long judicial evolution:

• Shankari Prasad (1951) & Golaknath (1967) Cases: The initial debate centered on whether fundamental rights could be amended. In Golaknath, the Supreme Court held that Parliament could not amend Fundamental Rights.
• Kesavananda Bharati Case (1973): To resolve the deadlock, a 13-judge bench of the Supreme Court propounded the ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’. It held that while Parliament has wide-ranging powers to amend any part of the Constitution under Article 368, it cannot alter or destroy the "basic structure" or the foundational framework of the Constitution (e.g., democracy, secularism, federalism, separation of powers). This firmly established that Parliament's amending power is limited.

Parliament's Attempt to Enlarge Amending Power into Absolute Power In an attempt to bypass the limitations imposed by the Kesavananda Bharati ruling, Parliament enacted the 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976. It inserted two critical clauses into Article 368:

• Article 368(4): Stated that no constitutional amendment could be questioned in any court on any ground (removing Judicial Review).
• Article 368(5): Declared that there shall be "no limitation whatever" on the constituent power of Parliament to amend the Constitution.

This was a direct attempt by Parliament to expand its limited amending power into an absolute one, effectively granting itself the power to destroy the Basic Structure if it so wished.

Judicial Response: Why Limited Power Cannot be Enlarged In the Minerva Mills Case (1980), the Supreme Court struck down clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368. The Court's rationale provides the definitive answer to whether Parliament can destroy the Basic Structure by expanding its powers:

• Donee Principle: The Court held that Parliament is a 'donee' (recipient) of a limited power from the Constitution. A donee of a limited power cannot, by the exercise of that very power, convert it into an absolute power.
• Limited Power as a Basic Feature: The Court explicitly ruled that the "limited amending power of Parliament is itself a basic feature of the Constitution." Destroying this limitation would mean destroying the Basic Structure itself.
• Controlled vs. Uncontrolled Constitution: If Parliament were allowed to expand its amending power infinitely, it would transform a 'controlled constitution' (where the Constitution is supreme) into an 'uncontrolled constitution' (where Parliament is supreme), leading to legislative authoritarianism.

Inability of Parliament to Destroy the Basic Structure under Article 368 Based on constitutional jurisprudence, Parliament absolutely cannot destroy the Basic Structure by expanding its amending power, due to the following reasons:

1. Constitutional Supremacy: In India, the Constitution is supreme, not the Parliament. Any legislative or constituent action that violates the foundational ethos of the Constitution is ultra vires (beyond the powers).
2. Judicial Review as a Bulwark: The power of Judicial Review has been declared a part of the Basic Structure (reaffirmed in the L. Chandra Kumar Case, 1997). Parliament cannot amend Article 368 to shield its amendments from the scrutiny of the constitutional courts.
3. Implied Limitations: The makers of the Constitution envisioned a framework of checks and balances. The existence of fundamental rights, federalism, and an independent judiciary implies inherent limitations on the brute force of parliamentary majorities.
4. Contemporary Validation (The NJAC Case): In 2015, Parliament passed the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act to create the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). Despite a massive parliamentary majority and ratification by states, the Supreme Court struck it down because it violated the 'independence of the judiciary'—a core component of the Basic Structure.

Conclusion The Basic Structure doctrine acts as a safety valve that preserves the soul of the Indian Republic. While the Constitution is a living document that must adapt to changing times through Article 368, it is not a plaything of legislative majorities. By ruling that "limited power cannot be enlarged into absolute power," the Supreme Court successfully cemented the principle of Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law, ensuring that the foundational identity of the Indian Constitution remains eternal and indestructible.